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Illegal Immigration, State Law, and Deterrence†
By Mark Hoekstra and Sandra Orozco-Aleman*
A critical immigration policy question is whether state and federal 
policy can deter undocumented workers from entering the United 
States. We examine whether Arizona SB 1070, arguably the most 
restrictive and controversial state immigration law ever passed, 
deterred entry into Arizona. We do so by exploiting a unique dataset 
from a survey of undocumented workers passing through Mexican 
border towns on their way to the United States. Results indicate the 
bill’s passage reduced the flow of undocumented immigrants into 
Arizona by 30 to 70 percent, suggesting that undocumented workers 
from Mexico are responsive to changes in state immigration policy. (JEL J15, J18, J61, K37)
Current estimates indicate there are nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). There 
exists considerable debate regarding how to address this issue—options range from 
deportation to amnesty—as well as how to reduce the flow of undocumented work-
ers into the United States. With respect to reducing illegal immigration, there are 
two general types of policies. The first is improving border security directly through 
the increased use of fencing, aircraft, border patrol, and other measures. The sec-
ond—and less direct—policy is to lower the expected benefits from being in the 
United States illegally, thereby deterring entry. Some of these policies target labor 
demand by imposing penalties on employers of undocumented workers, while oth-
ers target labor supply by imposing penalties on undocumented workers themselves.
While there is a large literature examining the determinants and impacts of immi-
grant locational choice generally (e.g., Card 2001, Borjas 1999 and 2006), there is 
less research on the impact of these state and federal policies on illegal immigration. 
Much of the existing research has focused on the labor market impact of policies 
such as the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (Bansak and Raphael 
2001; Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995), the enforcement measures put into place 
after 9/11 (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009), and Immigration and Naturalization 
Service monitoring strategies (Dávila and Pagan 1997). In addition, among the 
papers that directly examine the effect of policies on illegal immigration flows, 
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most have focused on the impact of either border security or  demand-side penalties 
such as employer sanctions. For example, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) exploit 
time-series variation in border enforcement due to electoral cycles and changes in 
federal national defense spending to identify the impact of enforcement on border 
apprehensions. Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) examine whether the amnesty aspect 
of IRCA affected the long-term flow of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, 
and find no evidence that it did. Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014) use syn-
thetic control methods and Census data to examine the effect of a 2007 Arizona 
law mandating employers use E-Verify on the presence of foreign-born Hispanics, 
and find that it led to the exit of Hispanics. Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2015), 
and Sanchez (2015) use similar synthetic control methods to examine the impact 
of the anti-immigration law Arizona SB 1070 on the stock of noncitizen Hispanics 
in Arizona, with somewhat differing conclusions. Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 
(2015) find that the law had minimal effect, while Sanchez (2015) reports that the 
law resulted in a temporary one-year reduction of 10 to 16 percent in the propor-
tion of noncitizen Hispanics. Finally, Watson (2013) examines how state and local 
enforcement of federal immigration law affects immigrants’ locational decisions.
This paper complements this existing research by examining the impact of Arizona 
SB 1070 on the flow of illegal immigrants to and from Arizona from Mexico. We 
focus on Arizona SB 1070 because it is arguably the most restrictive and contro-
versial immigration bill ever passed by a state. The law, which was passed in April 
of 2010 and scheduled to take effect on July 29, targeted labor supply by making 
applying for or holding a job in Arizona without legal authorization a crime. It also 
required police officers to check the immigration status of anyone they believe may 
be in the country illegally, and allowed them to stop and arrest anyone they have 
reason to believe lacks proper immigration papers. The law also allowed police to 
arrest an individual they believe to have committed a crime that would cause him 
or her to be deported. In short, the law substantially increased the expected costs of 
being an unauthorized immigrant in Arizona.
One unique feature of the law critical to its evaluation is that it never went into 
full effect. On July 28, one day before the law was scheduled to go into effect, a 
federal judge issued a temporary injunction blocking much of the law pending the 
outcome of a legal challenge by the federal government. Two years later, the US 
Supreme Court struck down several components of the law. As a result, the primary 
way in which one can evaluate the impact of the law is to study the announcement 
effect of the law from April through July. This complicates the evaluation for sev-
eral reasons. The first is that because the announcement period lasts fewer than 
four months, it is difficult to estimate its impact using annual data coming from 
the American Community Survey (ACS) or the detailed March Supplement of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). The second is that while the CPS has less detailed 
data available at the monthly level measuring the stock of foreign-born noncitizen 
Hispanics already in Arizona, one might well expect this settled population to wait 
for the enactment of the law before moving, rather than responding to the announce-
ment. Finally, it may be difficult to detect a small change in the stock of Hispanics 
in Arizona due to a reduction in immigration into Arizona by new immigrants, who 
are likely more sensitive to the announcement of the new law.
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We overcome these issues by exploiting a unique dataset from Mexico in which 
undocumented workers were surveyed in Mexican border towns and Mexican airports 
on their way to or from the United States. These data have three major advantages. 
First, they are available at the monthly level, which is critical given the short time frame 
between the law’s passage and the temporary injunction. Second, these data focus on 
a population that is considerably more likely to be responsive to the announcement 
of a new law, since they have not yet settled into a location. Third, since the survey is 
given in Mexico and not in the United States, there is much less concern about asking 
and having respondents honestly answer whether they have papers authorizing them to 
work in the United States, enabling us to study the precise population targeted by the 
legislation. In fact, more than 94 percent of those surveyed who intended to cross into 
the United States in the next 30 days reported that they did not have legal permission 
to work in the United States. As a result, we can directly identify the population being 
targeted by SB 1070, which is not possible using other data sources.1
Results indicate that the passage and announcement of the law significantly 
deterred undocumented immigrants from settling in Arizona. Event study and 
 difference-in-differences estimates indicate that the law reduced illegal immi-
gration into Arizona from Mexico by a statistically significant 30 to 70 percent. 
Unsurprisingly, this effect was reduced by approximately half when the judge 
issued the preliminary injunction blocking much of the bill, which likely reflects the 
reduced certainty that the law would end up going into effect.
On the other hand, we find little evidence that the passage of the law induced 
undocumented immigrants already residing in Arizona to return to Mexico.
Collectively, these results suggest that the locational decisions of unauthorized 
immigrants entering the United States are responsive to state legal climates, at least 
in the case of the restrictive and well-publicized Arizona SB 1070.
I. Background of Arizona SB 1070
In the mid to late 2000s, the Arizona border was by far the most commonly 
crossed border with Mexico. For example, in 2009 the US Border Patrol reported 
that 46 percent of apprehensions made along the border with Mexico were made in 
Arizona. Similarly, in our data 76 percent of undocumented immigrants crossing 
into the United States said they planned to do so in Arizona.
As a result of this traffic, Arizona has had a longer history than most states in 
passing legislation in an attempt to deter illegal immigration. In 1996, the legislature 
passed a law that required proof of legal status in order to obtain a driver’s license. In 
2000, voters banned bilingual education by a vote of 63 to 37, effectively requiring 
all courses to be taught in English. In 2004, voters passed Proposition 200, which 
denied public benefits to those not in the country legally. Three years later, Arizona 
passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which requires the use of the E-Verify  system 
1 For example, Passel and Cohn (2011) estimate that of foreign-born noncitizen Hispanics residing in the United 
States—a group often studied as a proxy for unauthorized immigrants in Census data—more than half are actually 
authorized to be in the United States. Similarly, our own estimates using the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NAWS) indicate that even among the population of noncitizen foreign-born Hispanics with less than 12 years of 
education, fewer than 60 percent are unauthorized. 
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by all Arizona employers to assess the legal eligibility of all new hires, and imposes 
penalties on employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers.
In 2010, Arizona passed SB 1070, which was signed by the governor on April 23, 
2010, after having passed both houses in the legislature earlier that month. As passed, 
SB 1070 contained several different provisions. One of the provisions, referred to by 
critics as “show your papers,” required police to check the immigration status of any 
individual they arrested or detained. It also allowed police to stop and arrest anyone 
they had reason to believe was an undocumented immigrant. Other provisions made 
it a crime to be in Arizona as well as to apply for or hold a job in Arizona if one 
did not have valid immigration papers. Finally, another provision allowed police to 
arrest anyone suspected of having committed a crime that would cause him to be 
deported.
Importantly, the passage of the law received significant media attention in both 
the United States and Mexico. For example, after the governor signed the bill, the 
Office of the President of Mexico issued a statement condemning the law, as did 
the Organization of American States, which said the law creates a basis for racial 
discrimination (Reséndiz 2010, El Universal 2010c). Marcelo Ebrard, the mayor 
of Mexico City, also issued a statement condemning the law, saying it violated 
“all conventions” on human rights, and thousands of Latinos demonstrated outside 
the parliament building in Phoenix (El Universal 2010a). Governors and legisla-
tures of Mexican states also denounced the law (Martínez 2010, CNN México 
2010, and El Universal 2010b). Word of the law even made its way to Major 
League Baseball —protestors greeted the Arizona Diamondbacks in Chicago and 
Denver, and a US senator urged players to boycott the 2011 All-Star game, which 
was to take place in Phoenix (McGrath 2010, Herszenhorn 2010). Thus, given 
the high profile and controversial nature of the law, we believe it is likely that 
those immigrating illegally to the United States over this time would be aware 
of it.
The law was scheduled to go into effect on July 29, 2010. However, on July 28, 
US District Judge Susan Bolton blocked much of the bill, pending the outcome of a 
challenge to the law filed by the federal government. On June 25, 2012 the Supreme 
Court struck down much of the law, upholding only a provision that allows police to 
check immigration status under some circumstances.
II. Data
The data used in this project come from the Survey of Migration to the Northern 
Border (EMIF). The EMIF is a cross-sectional survey conducted by Mexican 
authorities with the objective of measuring a representative sample of the migrant 
flow across the US-Mexico border. It is conducted in eight border cities and five 
Mexican airports. Within localities, the survey is conducted at different zones (bus 
stations, train stations, international bridges, and customs inspection points) and at 
different points (access doors, boarding zones, gates, and baggage claim areas) by 
which migrants must pass. Importantly, the National Population Council estimates 
that 94 percent of the total border crossings occur through locations covered by the 
EMIF (Consejo Nacional de Población 2013).
232 AMERicAN EcoNoMic JoURNAL: EcoNoMic PoLicy MAy 2017
The survey consists of four separate questionnaires, each of which is targeted at 
a different group of immigrants. We focus on two of those questionnaires.2 The first 
is a survey of individuals who are in Mexican border cities, but are not residents 
of those cities. Specifically, we focus on those born in Mexico who were at least 
15 years old and who reported an intention to cross the border in the next 30 days 
to work in the United States, but did not have documentation to work there legally.3 
The second is conducted in border cities and Mexican airports and surveys migrants 
returning from the United States to Mexico. Again, we focus primarily on adults 
who had been working in the United States without legal authorization.4
These data offer several advantages in evaluating the impact of SB 1070 on immi-
gration into Arizona. A primary advantage is that the data are monthly level obser-
vations on the locational decisions of immigrants who are likely to be sensitive to 
the announcement of a law. This is important because while one would reasonably 
expect the decisions of those leaving Mexico for the United States to be affected 
by the announcement of the new law, one might also reasonably expect Hispanics 
already there to wait until the law went into effect before uprooting and moving else-
where. Thus, given the complicated legal challenges that followed and the uncer-
tainty of whether the law would ever go into effect, it is not clear when exactly one 
would expect current Hispanic residents to be impacted. In addition, monthly data 
on entry into Arizona from Mexico enable us to observe changes in flows directly, 
even if those monthly flows are small relative to the total stock of foreign-born 
noncitizen Hispanics in Arizona. This is a critical advantage of the EMIF data com-
pared to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and American Community Survey 
(ACS). Those data allow for either a monthly measure of the population stock of 
Hispanics in Arizona, who likely are not sensitive to the announcement of SB 1070, 
or an annual measure of the number of Hispanics who have migrated from Mexico 
in the previous year. With respect to the latter, the sample size is especially limiting: 
in the years between 2007 and 2012, the March CPS surveyed a total of only five 
low-educated, foreign-born noncitizens living in Arizona who arrived from Mexico 
in the previous year. By contrast, the EMIF surveyed 5,961 undocumented migrants 
destined for Arizona over that same time period.
A second advantage is that we observe directly whether the individuals in our 
data have papers to work in the United States. Importantly, not only is this question 
asked, but since the survey is administered in Mexico, there is likely less fear of 
answering these questions truthfully. This is reflected in the fact that 94 percent 
of the immigrants surveyed who intended to cross to the United States reported 
that they did not have papers. In contrast, using the CPS or ACS data limits one to 
examining the impact on a subset of Hispanics, such as foreign-born  noncitizens, 
2 One unused survey is conducted among migrants apprehended by the US border authorities and returned to 
Mexico. The other is conducted among individuals in border cities returning to different Mexican states, but who 
had not previously been in the United States. 
3 Of those who reported they intended to cross the border to work in the United States, 94 percent reported that 
they did not have documentation to do so legally. In addition, 99 percent reported that they intended to cross within 
the next 30 days. 
4 Because the immigrants we study do not have legal authorization to work in the United States and because the 
survey excludes those who are from the city in which they are interviewed, the survey effectively excludes those 
who are crossing the border for daily work in the United States. 
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that serves as a proxy for undocumented immigrants. This can be problematic; 
Passel and Cohn (2011) estimate that fewer than half of all foreign-born noncitizen 
Hispanics residing in the United States are unauthorized, and our own calculations 
using the National Agricultural Workers Survey suggest that fewer than 60 percent 
of foreign-born noncitizen Hispanics with less than 12 years of education are unau-
thorized.5 In addition, one might worry that unauthorized immigrants may be less 
likely to respond to a US government survey after a restrictive law such as SB 1070 
is passed. One might also worry that to the extent documented and undocumented 
immigrants are substitutes, it may be difficult to observe a decline in undocumented 
immigrants using CPS or ACS data.
Finally, in contrast to data on border patrol apprehensions, these data provide a 
measure of flows that is independent of enforcement measures, which could change 
in response to a law like SB 1070. And perhaps more importantly, the EMIF data 
have information on the ultimate destination of immigrants once they enter the 
United States, in addition to where they plan on crossing. This is a critical distinc-
tion, as our data show that while 76 percent of illegal immigrants crossed the border 
in Arizona, the majority of them were headed to other states. Thus, while Border 
Patrol apprehension data are likely useful in assessing the impact of national pol-
icies (e.g., Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), they are of limited use in studying the 
impact of state policies.6
For the main analysis, we limit our sample to undocumented immigrants who are 
entering the United States, though we also examine undocumented migrants return-
ing permanently to Mexico from the United States. We focus on the time period 
from January of 2009 through December of 2010, though we also show results that 
include 2011.7 Over this time period, we have observations on a total of 16,122 
unauthorized immigrants heading to the United States, and 4,005 immigrants return-
ing to Mexico from the United States.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. Ninety percent of those who intend to 
cross the border are male. Average age is 30 years old, while average years of school-
ing is 7.3. Only 15 percent of migrants are traveling with a family member, and only 
2 percent are traveling with a child. Nine percent of those entering the United States 
speak English, and 10 percent have previously worked in the United States. California 
is the most popular destination at 26 percent, while 13 percent of immigrants report 
they are headed to Arizona. Twenty-nine percent report that they do not know the 
state of destination. We expect this is due in large part to the migration of agricultural 
workers who move from one farm to another following the harvest season.
Of those returning to Mexico permanently, average age and education are some-
what higher (33 years old and 8.2 years of education.) In addition, because the 
airport survey is larger than the land survey for return migrants, 71 percent are 
5 The NAWS is the only survey of immigrants in the United States that records legal status. 
6 We also note that we were unable to acquire monthly border apprehension data by location. We were told that 
while these data had been available in the past, they were no longer being released due to concern that the informa-
tion would be used by those illegally crossing the border. 
7 We focus primarily on the time period ending in December 2010 because the identifying assumptions of our 
event study and difference-in-differences research designs likely become more tenuous as we look at longer and 
longer post-injunction time horizons. However, as shown in online Appendix Figure A1, results for this longer time 
horizon are similar to those shown in the main analysis. 
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 surveyed in an airport.8 Ninety percent of them worked in the United States, and 
the average time spent there was 37.1 months. Twenty-three percent of returning 
undocumented immigrants report spending the most time in California, compared 
to 4 percent for Arizona.
A limitation of these data is that we know only that respondents intend to cross 
the border in the next 30 days and reside in a given state, not whether they ultimately 
do so. For example, some may not do so because they are apprehended at the border. 
However, using estimates on the probability of apprehension by the Border Patrol 
along with the probability of attempting to re-enter the United States, we calculate 
a probability of successfully entering the United States of more than 90 percent. 
Still, we unfortunately have no way to verify that the immigrants surveyed do ulti-
mately reside in the intended state. Thus, while an advantage of the EMIF data 
is that we know whether or not the immigrants are unauthorized and can directly 
detect changes in the monthly flow of immigrants into Arizona from Mexico, a dis-
advantage is we must rely on survey responses with respect to intended destination.
8 We note, however, that results for return immigrants are similar regardless of whether we use both the land and 
airport surveys or focus only on one or the other. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics of Undocumented Workers Migrating to or from the US (EMiF)
Migrants to the United States Return migrants from the United States
Characteristic
Mean  
(standard deviation) Characteristic
Mean  
(standard deviation)
Age 29.5 Age 32.7
(10.7) (9.4)
Years of schooling 7.3 Years of schooling 8.2
(3.2) (3.3)
Women 0.10 Women 0.20
Married 0.58 Married 0.62
Speaks English 0.09 Speaks English 0.36
Previous migratory experience 0.11 Previous migratory experience 1.00
Worked in the US 0.10 Worked in the US 0.90
Traveling alone 0.52 Months in the US since entering 37.1
Migrating with family member 0.15 (37.8)
Migrating with a child 0.02 Returned by plane 0.71
State of destination in the US State of residence in the US
California 0.26 California 0.23
Arizona 0.13 Texas 0.17
Florida 0.06 New York 0.09
Texas 0.05 Illinois 0.07
New York 0.03 Florida 0.06
Illinois 0.02 New Jersey 0.04
Colorado 0.02 Arizona 0.04
Georgia 0.02 North Carolina 0.03
North Carolina 0.02 Georgia 0.03
Do not know 0.29 Colorado 0.02
Observations 16,122 Observations 4,005
Notes: The sample of individuals migrating from Mexico to the United States includes all undocumented migrants 
surveyed who are going to cross the border and enter the United States within 30 days. The sample of return 
migrants from the United States includes all undocumented migrants who return to Mexico and have no intention 
to reenter the United States. Respondents in 2009 were asked about migrating with children younger than 12, while 
respondents in 2010 were asked about children younger than 15.
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One thing we can do is compare the respondents in the EMIF survey to those 
in the American Community Survey. Results are shown in online Appendix Table 
A1, which compares the flow of migrants to the United States in 2009–2010 from 
the EMIF to Mexican migrants living in the United States who arrived in the previ-
ous year from the ACS. Migrants in the EMIF are somewhat younger (29.5 versus 
35.0), have less schooling (7.3 versus 9.3 years), are more likely to be male (90 
versus 65 percent), and are less likely to speak English (9 versus 50 percent). Online 
Appendix Table A1 also shows a comparison between recent immigrant location 
shares from the ACS and the EMIF. Across all 50 states, the correlation between 
the two measures is 0.78 and 0.77 for 2009 and 2010, respectively. Immigrants who 
intend to reside in Arizona are more likely to appear relative to the proportion sur-
veyed in Arizona by the ACS, while the opposite is true for Texas.
There are several potential explanations for these differences. One is that either 
or both of the surveys are not representative as intended. While that is certainly 
possible, we think that at least some differences are due to the distinction between 
measuring stock and flow. In particular, the EMIF was designed to measure flows, 
while the ACS surveys more settled immigrants. In addition, we believe that some 
of the differences are due to the fact that only around 60 percent of the respondents 
in the ACS are unauthorized immigrants, whereas all those we use in the EMIF data 
are unauthorized. This explanation is broadly consistent with the known differences 
between the two groups, as unauthorized immigrants are on average younger, less 
educated, and more likely to be male than authorized workers (Fry 2006; Passel and 
Cohn 2009; and Passel, Cohn, and Rohal 2015).
Finally, given that SB 1070 explicitly targeted migrants who intended to work in 
Arizona, it is helpful to understand the labor market experiences of likely undoc-
umented workers in the United States. Table 2 shows the labor force participa-
tion, unemployment rate, health insurance coverage, hourly wage, and industry 
of employment for recent migrants to the United States, as surveyed in the 2014 
Current Population Survey. We break migrants down into four groups, each of 
which is sufficiently large to be illustrative: male foreign-born Hispanics, male 
noncitizen Mexican immigrants who arrived in the previous year, male Hispanics in 
Arizona, and male foreign-born Hispanics in Arizona. Results show that migrants 
have labor force participation rates above 75 percent, and earn an hourly wage of 
$15–$17 per hour. Only around 50 percent are working in jobs eligible for health 
insurance. The most common industries are construction, manufacturing, and trade 
(wholesale and retail).
III. Methodology
To identify effects of SB 1070 on immigration flows into Arizona from Mexico, 
we ask whether undocumented immigrants headed for the United States were 
any less likely to go to Arizona once the law was passed and set to go into effect. 
Specifically, we ask whether immigrants were less likely to report that their ultimate 
destination across the border was Arizona during the time period of April through 
July of 2010, when the law was passed and set to go into effect, but before the fed-
eral judge issued a temporary block of much of the law.
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We do this using three different research designs. First, we perform an event 
study using individual-level data to examine whether the proportion of unauthorized 
immigrants destined for Arizona fell between April and July of 2010, when the law 
had been passed but not yet enacted or blocked.9
Formally, we estimate the following using ordinary least squares:
(1) Destination_A Z it =  β 0 +  β 1 Post_Passag e it +  β 2 Post_injunctio n it +  ε it ,
where Destination_AZ is an indicator equal to one for individual i at time period t if 
the individual plans to reside in Arizona, Post_Passage is an indicator equal to one 
after the law was passed, and Post_injunction is an indicator equal to one after the 
9 An alternative methodology would be to use a synthetic control approach as proposed by Abadie, Diamond, 
and Hainmueller (2010) and implemented by Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014) in examining the impact of the 
Legal Arizona Workers Act passed in Arizona in 2007. We do not implement this approach because it relies heavily 
on using a long time-series of data before the treatment to construct a synthetic counterfactual that closely tracks the 
treated state. This is difficult because Arizona passed several laws prior to 2010 that would likely impact flows of 
undocumented workers into Arizona. For example, Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2014) document the significant 
impact that the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 had on the presence of various subgroups of Hispanics. 
Table 2—Labor Market Experiences of Hispanics and Recent Mexican Migrants  
(March 2014 current Population Survey)
Male 
foreign-born 
Hispanics
Male  
noncitizen 
Mexican 
immigrants 
arrived within 
the last two 
years
Male 
Hispanics in 
Arizona
Male 
foreign-born 
Hispanics in 
Arizona
Labor force participation 81% 94% 72% 77%
Insurance coverage 58% 35% 62% 50%
Observations (CPS sample) 5,145 106 309 119
Observations (population estimates using sample weights) 8,941,119 191,694 820,925 312,705
Unemployment rate 5.8% 6.0% 9.9% 0.7%
industry of employment
Construction 23% 26% 15% 25%
Manufacturing 13% 13% 14% 9%
Trade (wholesale and retail) 21% 27% 20% 15%
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 10% 15% 9% 17%
Transportation, communication, and public utilities 8% 4% 11% 11%
Services (business, repair, and personal services) 10% 11% 9% 9%
Professional and related services 7% 2% 10% 11%
Entertainment and recreational services 2% 0% 2% 1%
Mining 1% 0% 1% 0%
Finance, insurance, and real estate 3% 1% 1% 0%
Public administration 2% 1% 6% 3%
Other 0% 0% 2% 0%
Observations (CPS sample) 4,196 98 215 92
Observations (population estimates using sample weights) 7,269,960 180,071 592,073 241,415
Hourly wage (in 2014 dollars) $17.47 $15.23 $17.57 $16.13
Observations (CPS sample) 3,837 89 174 78
Observations (population estimates using sample weights) 6,623,614 163,274 496,943 208,582
Source: March 2014 Current Population Survey
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federal injunction was issued. In some specifications, we also include a month fixed 
effect (i.e., 12 indicator variables) to control for seasonality.
The primary coefficient of interest is  β 1 , which measures the reduction in the 
probability of migrating to Arizona after the law was passed but before it was 
blocked, relative to the pre-SB 1070 probability of migrating to Arizona. The identi-
fying assumption is that in the absence of the passage of SB 1070, the rate at which 
entering undocumented immigrants went to Arizona would have remained the same 
as it was prior to the passage of the law in April of 2010. We view this assumption as 
reasonable given that the rate at which undocumented immigrants went to Arizona 
was remarkably stable over the 15 months prior to the passage of the law, suggesting 
that seasonality effects over this period seem relatively minor.
Our second approach uses an event study with data aggregated by month and 
destination. As a result, we estimate the following equation:
(2)  LogArizonaMigrant s t =  β 0 +  β 1 Post_Passag e t +  β 2 Post_injunctio n t 
 +  φ t +   ε t ,
where  LogArizonaMigrants t is the natural log of the number of migrants migrating 
to Arizona in month t. In this approach, the identifying assumption is that the log 
of the number of migrants destined for Arizona would have stayed at pre-SB 1070 
levels absent the legislation, conditional on the month fixed effect as a control for 
seasonality. While this identifying assumption is stronger than that required in the 
approach from equation (1), the advantage of this approach is that it does not use 
migrant flows to other states as a counterfactual, since SB 1070 could potentially 
affect migrant flows to those states due to either displacement or deterrent effects.
A threat to identification common across both of these approaches is the possi-
bility that passage of SB 1070 coincided with other factors that would have resulted 
in reduced migration to Arizona. We address this issue in several ways. First, we 
include month fixed effects to absorb any effects of seasonality common across des-
tinations. Second, in online Appendix Figure A2 we show that the unemployment 
rates of Hispanics working in construction, services, and trade in Arizona were sim-
ilar over this time period compared to those in California, Florida, and Texas, which 
together with Arizona are the four most common destination states. Similarly, we 
show that including these unemployment rates as controls does not affect our esti-
mates, suggesting that our estimated effects of SB 1070 are not driven by Arizona-
specific time shocks.10 Finally, we show that allowing for linear time trends does 
not affect our estimates.
Our third approach uses a difference-in-differences research design, which 
requires a different assumption from the event studies. Specifically, we assume 
that the relative change in the number of immigrants destined for Arizona would 
have been similar to the relative change in the number of immigrants destined for 
10 We computed these monthly employment rates using data from the Current Population Survey for Hispanics 
living in the four states that are the most common destination states of undocumented migrants in our sample. 
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elsewhere. To implement this approach, we collapse the individual-level data into 
group-by-month cells, where one cell per month measures the number of immi-
grants destined for Arizona, and the other measures the number of immigrants des-
tined for elsewhere. Formally, we estimate the following:
(3)  ln  (immigrants) it =  ψ t +  θ 1 Destination_AZ 
 +  θ 2 ((Destination _ AZ) ×  (Post _ Passage) ) it 
 +  θ 3  ((Destination _ AZ ) × (Post _ injunction)) it +  ε it ,
where i denotes whether the observation measures the number of immigrants headed 
to Arizona, or elsewhere; and t denotes year-by-month. The variable Destination_AZ 
is an indicator equal to one if the observation is for immigrants headed to Arizona 
and zero otherwise;  ψ t is a set of year-by-month fixed effects, which allows for 
separate shocks to immigration during each of the 24 months in the sample that are 
common across destinations. The main coefficient of interest is  θ 2 , which measures 
the reduction in the number of immigrants headed to Arizona after the law was 
passed, relative to the change in the number of immigrants headed elsewhere. The 
coefficient  θ 3 measures the marginal impact of the law being blocked by the federal 
judge, relative to the law’s impact between April and July when it was passed.
The primary drawback to this approach is that to the extent the Arizona law induced 
immigrants to go elsewhere in the United States, as opposed to stay in Mexico, the 
difference-in-differences estimate can be overstated. To address this issue, in one 
specification we explicitly adjust the data to account for the possibility that migrants 
otherwise headed to Arizona went to other states instead. Specifically, using the 
event study methodology outlined in equation (2), for each of the four months 
(April–July) that the law was passed, we estimate the reduction in the number of 
surveyed migrants destined for Arizona. We then assume that all of those would-be 
migrants to Arizona instead went to other states, and remove an identical number 
of surveyed migrants headed elsewhere from the dataset. As a result, we estimate 
effects using the conservative assumption that all of the missing migrants to Arizona 
went to other states and inflated those migration numbers.
With respect to statistical inference, in addition to reporting robust standard 
errors, we also perform additional permutation exercises to test empirically how 
frequently estimates of the magnitudes we find occur by chance. We do so by 
following the method proposed by Anderson (2008) for performing permu-
tation-based inference. Specifically, we randomly assign each observation in a 
new permuted dataset (e.g., the number of undocumented workers immigrating 
to Arizona in January of 2009), without replacement, from the observations in 
our actual dataset (e.g., January 2009–December 2010). This process effectively 
re-orders each data point in our sample. We then estimate our same model 10,000 
times, each time assuming that the first 15 months were the pre-period, the next 
4 months were the first treatment period, and the last 5 months were the second 
treatment period. By doing so we receive a null distribution of t-statistics. We then 
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report for each of our estimates of interest the proportion of t-statistics from the 
null distribution that are more extreme than the t-statistic for our estimate. That 
is, for each negative estimate of the impact of SB 1070, we report the proportion 
of the simulated t-statistics that are more negative than the t-statistic from that 
estimate.
In addition, we also perform placebo tests in order to test how often there have 
been large reductions in immigration into Arizona over a consecutive three-month 
period in the past. Specifically, we use a dataset from January 2002 to December 
2013. We then choose a 24-month period, and just as for our actual dataset, assume 
that the first 15 months are the pre-period, followed by 4 months of treatment (for 
passage of SB 1070), and 5 months of a second treatment (post-injunction). In each 
case we assume Arizona is treated, and other states are not, so as to generate esti-
mates of how immigration flows in Arizona change due to chance. Excluding all 
24-month periods in which placebo treatment overlaps with actual treatment, this 
gives us a total of 119 placebo estimates. We then ask how the magnitude of our 
actual estimate corresponds to this distribution of placebo estimates. To the extent 
that our estimates are more extreme than nearly all placebo estimates, it offers fur-
ther evidence that the reduction in migration to Arizona coinciding with SB 1070 
was unlikely to occur due to chance.
Finally, while the main focus of our study is the deterrent effect of SB 1070 on 
illegal immigrant flows into Arizona, we also ask whether the law affects return 
migration decisions. That is, we ask whether SB 1070 induced undocumented immi-
grants to return to Mexico from Arizona. To do so, we estimate a modified version 
of equation (1) in which we instead use a dependent variable equal to one if the 
individual returned to Mexico from Arizona.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the approaches outlined above. 
For example, while we can use the passage of SB 1070 to identify the short-run 
effects of such a law, we note that the long-run effects could be quite different. To 
the extent that social networks adjust to the new law more over time and prospec-
tive migrants have time to consider more alternatives, the long-run effects could be 
larger than the short-run effects. On the other hand, migrants may be more cautious 
in the short run as they seek to assess the new legal climate, in which case the 
 long-run effects could be smaller.
In addition, we emphasize that we study the impact of this law in the context of 
one state that is passing it. As a result, while our data and approaches are well-suited 
for examining whether a state law deterred undocumented immigrants from entering 
that state, we are unable to determine whether those individuals stayed in Mexico, 
or if they went to another state. This is largely because only around 15 percent of 
migrants intended to reside in Arizona, making any displacement across other states 
undetectable in the data. This limitation also makes it difficult for us to speak to 
what the impact of a similar law would be if it were passed by all states or the federal 
government. To the extent that Arizona SB 1070 does shift migrants to other states, 
a national approach might well lead to smaller deterrence effects than we observe in 
this context. On the other hand, we would expect a national policy to be more effec-
tive at reducing overall migration into the United States than a policy like SB 1070 
due to reduced displacement effects.
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IV. Results
We begin by examining the graphical evidence of immigrant flows into the United 
States from Mexico. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the number of survey respondents 
immigrating to the United States, by destination. It shows that there was a steep 
decline in the number of undocumented immigrants headed for Arizona beginning 
in April of 2010, the month the bill was passed, continuing through July of 2010, the 
last month before the federal injunction was issued.11
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the proportion of immigrants destined for Arizona, and 
shows that a similar pattern holds in relative terms. While the proportion of undoc-
umented immigrants going to Arizona had previously fluctuated between 15 and 
20 percent, it steadily declined from April through July of 2010, reaching a low of 
just below 5 percent. After the federal injunction was issued at the end of July, sig-
naling uncertainty that many of the provisions in the law would ever go into effect, 
the proportion of immigrants headed to Arizona increased to around 12 percent. In 
short, the raw data suggest that undocumented immigrants were deterred from going 
to Arizona by the announcement of the law, though that effect was diminished by 
approximately one-half by the federal injunction blocking much of the law. We now 
turn to estimating these effects formally using each of our three approaches.
A. Event Study Estimates Using individual-Level Data
Estimates from equation (1) are shown in Table 3. The specification in column 1 
includes no controls, while columns 2–7 include month fixed effects (i.e., 12 indi-
cator variables—one for each month). Column 3 includes controls for the unem-
ployment rates of Hispanics working in construction, services, and trade in Arizona, 
California, Florida, and Texas, which are the four most common destination states in 
our sample. Column 4 includes a linear time trend while column 5 includes a leading 
indicator variable testing for whether the migration rate changed in the six months 
prior to the passage of SB 1070. Column 6 includes data from 2011 in addition to 
2009 and 2010. Finally, column 7 adjusts for the possibility that SB 1070 induced 
Arizona-bound migrants to instead migrate to other US states. Since this could 
potentially result in overstating deterrence effects, we use equation (2) in order to 
estimate the number of “missing” Arizona-bound migrants during the months of 
April–July. We then subtract that number of migrants from the pool of applicants 
11 Panel A of Figure 1 also shows that there is a significant increase in migration to Arizona in March of 2010. 
While one might be concerned that this increase is due to anticipation of the law being passed, we view that explana-
tion as unlikely for two reasons. First, while we would expect an anticipation effect among those migrants traveling 
through Arizona, we would not expect it for those intending to reside in Arizona, since the law would apply to them 
no differently than if they were to arrive a month or two later. Second, we observe increased migration to other states 
during March of 2010, as well as increases during March across other years, both of which suggest this is a season-
ality effect. For example, the overall increase in monthly migration to the United States in our data from February to 
March was 57 percent, 46 percent, and 42 percent during 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. Similarly, more people 
were apprehended in March by US Border Patrol than in any other month during all but 2 of the 14 years between 
2000 and 2013. To address the role of seasonality, as discussed in the previous section, we use a combination of 
strategies. These include examining the rate at which migrants go to Arizona compared to elsewhere, and including 
month fixed effects and month-by-destination-state fixed effects. 
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destined for other states over those same four months, implicitly assuming they had 
gone to those other states.
As shown in column 1 of panel A in Table 3, the unconditional estimate of 
the impact of the law on the likelihood of immigrating to Arizona is a reduction 
of 7.4  percentage points, which represents a 44 percent relative decline and is 
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statistically  significant at the 1 percent level. Adding month effects in column 2 
reduces the estimate slightly to 6.7 percentage points, while adding sector-specific 
unemployment rates for Hispanics in column 3 increases the estimate to 9.2 per-
centage points. Including a linear time trend in column 4 results in a 5.8 percentage 
point decline. Estimates in column 5 indicate that there is no evidence of a reduction 
in migration to Arizona before the law was passed in April of 2010. Including data 
from 2011 in column 6 results in a similar estimate of 6.3 percentage points. Finally, 
adjusting the data for the possibility that migrants were displaced to other states 
in column 7 only slightly reduces the estimate from 6.7 to 6.0 percentage points. 
Importantly, all seven estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Collectively, these estimates confirm the visual evidence in Figure 1: the announce-
ment of SB 1070 is associated with a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful reduction in illegal immigration into Arizona.
Table 3—Event Study Estimates of the Effect of Arizona SB 1070 on the Likelihood  
of Immigrating to Arizona
Dependent variable: Immigrating to Arizona  
 from Mexico for work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A
After Arizona law −0.074 −0.067 −0.092 −0.058 −0.067 −0.063 −0.060
(April 2010–December 2010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.033) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
[0.0011] [0.0059] [0.1769] [0.0980] [0.0043]
After temporary block by federal judge 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006
(August 2010–December 2010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013)
Six months prior to passage of Arizona law – – – – −0.012 –
(0.010)
Panel B
Months since passage of Arizona law −0.032 −0.039 −0.029 −0.034 −0.039 – −0.037
 (range = 0 to 3.17) (0.002) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.3524] [0.0129] [0.0002]
Months after temporary block by federal judge 0.014 0.018 0.029 0.017 0.016 – 0.016
 (range = 0 to 5.23) (0.002) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Six months prior to passage of Arizona law – – – – −0.008 –
(0.011)
Estimated effect as of July 27, 2010 −0.103 −0.123 −0.091 −0.107 −0.123 – −0.117
(0.008) (0.013) (0.062) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.3524] [0.0129] [0.0002]
Estimated effect as of October 27, 2010 −0.059 −0.068 −0.003 −0.055 −0.074 – −0.067
(0.006) (0.010) (0.080) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Mean of dependent variable pretreatment 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Observations 16,122 16,122 16,122 16,122 16,122 26,751 15,889
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes time-varying controls No No Yes No No No No
Includes linear time trend No No No Yes No No No
Includes 2011 data No No No No No Yes No
Adjusts for potential displacement of Arizona  
 immigrants to other states?
No No No No No No Yes
Notes: Each column represents a separate ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors are in paren-
theses, while empirical p-values measuring the proportion of permutation t-statistics lying to the left of the t-statis-
tics are shown in square brackets. The sample includes all surveyed undocumented workers in Mexico planning to 
cross the border into the United States in the next 30 days. Time-varying controls include the unemployment rates 
of Hispanics working in construction, services (business, repair, and personal services), and trade (wholesale and 
retail) in the states of Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas.
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Importantly, there is little evidence that the significant reduction in the proportion 
of immigrants saying they intend to reside in Arizona is due to a shift toward not 
reporting where they intend to reside. The number and proportion of migrants who 
report unknown destination are shown in online Appendix Figures A1a and A1b, 
which show little evidence the reduction in migration to Arizona was accompanied 
by a similar increase in migrants reporting unknown destinations.
The second row of panel A of Table 3 shows estimates of the marginal impact 
of the law after the federal judge issued an injunction at the end of July. Estimates 
are close to zero, and none of the seven estimates are statistically different 
from zero.
In addition, we also estimate the effects of the laws in a way that more closely 
models the raw data shown in Figure 1. Specifically, rather than allowing for only 
level changes, which estimates the average impact of the law during the specified 
period, in panel B of Table 3 we estimate slope effects, and then use the estimated 
slopes to estimate the cumulative effect of the law at a given point in time. That 
is, we fit lines to the underlying data between April and July, when the law was 
passed, and from August through December of 2010, after the federal judge issued 
the injunction. The reason we do so is that the underlying data shown in Figure 1 
suggest that illegal immigrant flows were headed toward a new equilibrium after the 
passage of the law, but had not yet hit that equilibrium when the federal judge issued 
the injunction.
Results are shown in panel B of Table 3. The estimates in the first row range 
from as small as −0.029 (column 3) to −0.039. All but one of the estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These estimates indicate that for each 
of the roughly three months following the passage of SB 1070, immigration flows 
into Arizona fell by around 3 percentage points, or just less than 20 percent. The 
fourth row of panel B shows estimates of the cumulative effect of the law as of July 
27, 2010, the day before the federal injunction, at between 9.1 and 12.3 percentage 
points. These reductions represent 54 to 74 percent reductions in migrant flows to 
Arizona given the baseline rate of 16.7 percent.
Estimates in the second row of panel B in Table 3 also suggest that migration 
flows into Arizona increased each month after the federal injunction, with estimates 
ranging from 1.4 to 2.9 percentage points per month. This suggests that while the 
passage of SB 1070 reduced illegal migration flows by as much as 75 percent, that 
effect was partly offset by the federal injunction blocking the bill from going into 
effect.
Permutation tests provide additional support that the observed reduction in 
the fraction of undocumented workers destined for Arizona was unlikely due to 
chance. The six one-sided p-values computed for estimates of interest shown in 
columns 1, 2, and 5 of both panels of Table 3 are less than 1 percent. Estimates 
in which time-varying controls or linear time trends are included (columns 3 
and 4) are somewhat less precise, with p-values ranging from 0.013 to 0.352. 
Additionally, in online Appendix Figure A3 we also show that our estimates of 
interest are more negative than the vast majority of placebo estimates derived 
from similar datasets from 2002 through 2013. On average, only 2.9 percent of 
placebo estimates were more negative than the estimates shown in panels A and B 
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in  columns 1, 2, and 4 of Table 3.12 Collectively, this suggests that the reductions 
in immigration to Arizona shown in Table 3 were unlikely to arise due to chance, 
and that historically it was rare for Arizona to experience four-month reductions in 
migrant rates of the magnitude observed when SB 1070 was passed.
B. Event Study Estimates Using Month-Level Aggregate Data
We now turn to estimating the impact of SB 1070 on migration flows to Arizona 
using data aggregated to the month and state-of-destination level, as in equation (2). 
The advantage of this approach is that because flows to other states are not used in 
computing the migration rate, the estimate is unaffected by the possibility that those 
who would have gone to Arizona instead go to another state. The disadvantage, 
however, is that as shown in panel A of Figure 1, there is evidence of significant 
time effects at work over this period. That means controlling for those time effects 
is necessary, which is difficult with such a relatively short window and limited 
observations.
Results are shown in Table 4, which follows the format of Table 3. Estimates in 
panel A range from −0.339 to −0.706, implying that migration rates to Arizona 
were 30 to 70 percent lower after the law was passed, compared to the 15 months 
prior to that. In general, however, estimates are not precisely estimated despite 
their large economic magnitudes; only two of five coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. However, we note that empirical p-values suggest 
these estimates were unlikely to arise due to chance, as they range from 0.0016 to 
0.0462.13
Results for the slope specification are shown in panel B of Table 4. Resulting esti-
mates are more precise, and suggest that for each month after the passage of the bill, 
migration rates to Arizona were reduced by between 17 and 25 percent. All estimates 
are significant at the 1 percent level using conventional inference, and empirical p-val-
ues based on permutations range from 0.0000 to 0.0289. Results indicate that the 
day before the federal injunction, the number of immigrants destined for Arizona was 
50 to 75 percent lower than during the pre-SB 1070 period. In addition, this down-
ward trajectory in migration was reduced somewhat when the federal judge issued the 
injunction, at which point migration rates rose by 12 to 29 percent per month.
C. Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Finally, we turn to the difference-in-differences estimates, which are shown 
in Table  5. Columns 1–4 include the entire sample of undocumented work-
ers, while columns 5–8 use only those with known destinations. For each set of 
results, the specification in the first column controls for only year-by-month and 
12 We focused this test on our main specifications of interest. We excluded the specification that included 
time-varying controls (column 3), tested for divergence in the pre-period (column 5), included more years of data 
(column 6), or required an adjustment to the dataset (column 7). 
13 In addition, we note that when we conduct placebo tests using data on historical immigration to Arizona as 
shown in Figure A4 in the online Appendix, only 11.76 and 3.36 percent of estimates were larger in magnitude than 
the estimates of −0.439 and −0.706 shown in columns 1 and 3. 
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 state-of-destination fixed effects. Columns 2 and 6 replace year-by-month fixed 
effects with time-varying controls for the unemployment rates of Hispanics in con-
struction, services, and trade for Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas. Columns 3 
and 7 include  destination state fixed effects and year-by-month fixed effects, and add 
 state-by-month fixed effects.
Finally, columns 4 and 8 address a potential downside of this difference-in- 
differences design, which is that the control state observations are potentially con-
taminated to the extent that migrants switched from Arizona to, say, California. 
While any such bias should be relatively small due to the small fraction of migrants 
destined for Arizona compared to other states, it could be present. In columns 4 
and 8, we explicitly adjust for this by conservatively assuming that all “missing” 
migrants to Arizona did in fact migrate to other states, rather than stay in Mexico. 
Specifically, we estimate an equation similar to equation (2) using data aggregated 
to the month and destination to estimate how many migrants were deterred from 
entering Arizona. We then subtract that number of migrants from the corresponding 
month from the control group, and re-estimate the effects.
Table 4—Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SB 1070 on the Number of Immigrants Going to 
Arizona (aggregate data)
Dependent variable: log of number of undocumented  
 immigrants going to Arizona 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A
After Arizona law −0.439 −0.576 −0.706 −0.439 −0.339
(April 2010–July 2010) (0.240) (0.128) (0.273) (0.253) (0.215)
[0.0886] [0.0016] [0.0261] [0.0941]
After temporary injunction 0.561 0.143 0.561 0.591 0.307
(August 2010–December 2010) (0.316) (0.133) (0.334) (0.377) (0.217)
Six months prior to passage of Arizona law – – – 0.049 –
(0.191)
Panel B
Months since passage of Arizona law (range = 0 to 4) −0.166 −0.183 −0.250 −0.171 –
(0.051) (0.023) (0.063) (0.052)
[0.0289] [0.0000] [0.0066] [0.0279]
Months after temporary block by federal judge (range = 0 to 5) 0.240 0.118 0.257 0.293 –
(0.099) (0.027) (0.106) (0.115)
Six months prior to passage of Arizona law – – – 0.218 –
(0.126)
Estimated effect as of July 27, 2010 −0.497 −0.550 −0.750 −0.513 –
(0.152) (0.070) (0.190) (0.156)
Estimated effect as of October 27, 2010 0.223 −0.196 0.020 0.366 –
(0.215) (0.034) (0.237) (0.258)
Observations 24 24 24 24 36
Month fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Includes time-varying controls No Yes No No No
Includes linear time trend No No Yes No No
Includes 2011 No No No No Yes
Notes: Each column represents a separate ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses, while empirical p-values measuring the proportion of permutation t-statistics lying to the left of the t-statistics 
are shown in square brackets. Time-varying controls include the unemployment rates of Hispanics working in con-
struction, services (business, repair, and personal services), and trade (wholesale and retail) in the states of Arizona, 
California, Florida, and Texas.
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Results shown in Table 5 provide further evidence that SB 1070 significantly 
deterred migration into Arizona. Estimates across columns 1–8 indicate that passing 
the law reduced immigration flows into Arizona by 60 to 80 percent. All estimates 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and 6 of 8 estimates are significant 
at the 1 percent level. Permutation tests also suggest that the reduction in immigrant 
flows to Arizona shown in Table 5 were unlikely to occur by chance; empirical 
p-values range from 0.0000 to 0.0822. This provides further evidence that these 
declines were caused by SB 1070, and were not a result of general randomness in 
migrant flows to Arizona.
D. Heterogeneous Effects of SB 1070
We now ask whether the passage of Arizona SB 1070 had differential deterrent 
effects on various subgroups of migrants. We begin by examining the behavior of 
first-time migrants compared to migrants with previous migration experience. To 
the extent that SB 1070 is responsible for the reduction in overall immigration into 
Arizona shown in Figure 1, we would expect to see a larger reduction among new 
migrants who have not yet established social and work networks. Figure 2 shows 
this is indeed the case: panel A of Figure 2 shows a large reduction in the likelihood 
of unauthorized new migrants going to Arizona, while panel B of Figure 2 shows 
little evidence that the locational decisions of experienced migrants were affected. 
This pattern of results also provides additional evidence that it would be difficult to 
detect an impact of the announcement of SB 1070 using Census data on the stock 
of Hispanics already in Arizona; if the locational decisions of experienced migrants 
Table 5—Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of SB 1070 on the Number of 
Undocumented Immigrants Going to Arizona 
Dependent variable: log of number of undocumented  
 immigrants going to the US, by destination  
  (Arizona or elsewhere) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
After Arizona law × destined for Arizona −0.771 −0.648 −0.746 −0.681 −0.739 −0.638 −0.662 −0.586
(April 2010–July 2010) (0.228) (0.149) (0.335) (0.207) (0.230) (0.143) (0.324) (0.204)
[0.0023] [0.0001] [0.0608] [0.0032] [0.0000] [0.0822]
After temporary injunction × destined for Arizona 0.196 0.228 0.164 0.106 0.075 0.198 0.012 −0.078
(August 2010–December 2010) (0.249) (0.165) (0.367) (0.231) (0.249) (0.161) (0.353) (0.225)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Sample All immigrants Immigrants with known destinations
Includes destination state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes year-by-month fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Includes state-by-month fixed effects No No Yes No No No Yes No
Includes time-varying controls No Yes No No No Yes No No
Adjusts for potential displacement of Arizona  
 immigrants to other states?
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate ordinary least squares regression. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses, while empirical p-values measuring the proportion of permutation t-statistics lying to the left of 
the t-statistics are shown in square brackets. Time varying controls include the unemployment rates of Hispanics 
working in construction, services (business, repair, and personal services), and trade (wholesale and retail) in the 
states of Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas. In columns 4 and 8 we use estimated reductions in the number of 
people going to Arizona during each of the post-passage months and subtract them from those going to other states.
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are unaffected, it seems likely that the decisions of those already in Arizona would 
also be unaffected.14
In contrast, however, we find very few differences in effects across other demo-
graphic characteristics such as age, years of schooling, gender, or marital status. 
This is shown in Figure 3, which shows the percent declines in these various groups 
14 An open question remains whether the locational decisions of return migrants and migrants already residing 
in Arizona would have been affected if SB 1070 had been fully implemented. 
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from April through July of 2010, compared to the four months prior. It is also shown 
in Table 6, which shows that those migrating between April and July of 2010 were 
very similar to those migrating in the four months prior. Thus, while the deterrent 
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Figure 3. Percent Reductions, by Demographic Group, in Monthly Migrant Flows to Arizona in the 
Months after Passage of SB 1070 Compared to the Four Months Prior to Passage (EMIF)
Note: Each panel shows the average per-month flow of migrants in the EMIF sample destined for Arizona after SB 
1070 was passed and before the federal injunction was issued compared to the four months prior to the passage.
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effect of SB 1070 is clearly driven by first-time migrants, the passage of the law 
seemed to have similar effects across other demographic groups.
E. Estimated Effects on Return Migration to Mexico
We also test whether the law induced undocumented workers to leave Arizona 
for Mexico. The number and proportion of undocumented immigrants returning 
 permanently from Arizona to Mexico are shown in Figure 4. It shows that there 
is little evidence to suggest that SB 1070 induced workers to leave Arizona for 
Mexico. This lack of evidence is also evident in the corresponding regression esti-
mates obtained using equation (1), shown in Table 7. The estimates are small and 
negative, providing no evidence that existing undocumented workers were induced 
to return to Mexico as a result of SB 1070.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines whether the passage of Arizona SB 1070, arguably the most 
restrictive and controversial anti-illegal immigration legislation ever passed by a 
state, deterred entry of undocumented workers into Arizona. More broadly, it asks 
whether state policies that increase the expected penalties associated with unautho-
rized immigration can serve as effective deterrents.
Results indicate that the passage of Arizona SB 1070 significantly reduced the 
flow of undocumented workers into Arizona from Mexico by 30 to 70 percent. 
Unsurprisingly, this deterrent effect was diminished when a federal judge issued an 
injunction blocking much of the bill from going into effect.
Table 6—Characteristics of Undocumented Mexican Migrants Going to Arizona 
before and after SB 1070 (EMIF )
Migrants to Arizona from Mexico
From December 2009 to 
March 2010
From April 2010 to July 
2010
Variable Mean (standard deviation) Mean (standard deviation)
Age 31.0 29.9
(11.0) (9.0)
Years of schooling 7.9 8.1
(3.3) (3.3)
Women 0.12 0.11
Married 0.61 0.66
Traveling alone 0.46 0.46
Migrating with family member 0.11 0.12
Migrating with a child 0.03 0.02
Speaks English 0.11 0.13
Previous migratory experience 0.06 0.13
Worked in the US 0.06 0.13
Already have a job secured in US 0.10 0.09
Observations 462 285
Note: The sample includes all undocumented Mexican migrants in the survey who state they 
will cross the border and enter the United States within 30 days and intend to reside in Arizona.
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These results suggest that the decision to immigrate without authorization is sen-
sitive to expected benefits and costs, even to the point that a law that has only been 
announced, but not enacted, impacts the immigration and locational decisions of 
new immigrants from Mexico. This immediate response is especially striking given 
that most of these prospective migrants have low levels of education and do not 
speak English, and suggests that information on immigration laws such as SB 1070 
moves quickly and accurately through informal channels. Finally, while the large 
deterrent effect documented here does not mean that laws like Arizona SB 1070 are 
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socially desirable—much less constitutional—it does suggest that laws like this will 
continue to have appeal among states attempting to reduce the inflow of unautho-
rized immigrants.
REFERENCES
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. 2010. “Synthetic Control Methods for Com-
parative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program.” Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 105 (490): 493–505. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, and Fernando Lozano. 2015. “On the Effectiveness of SB1070 in Ari-
zona.” Economic inquiry 53 (1): 335–51.
Anderson, Michael L. 2008. “Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Inter-
vention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Peery Preschool, and Early Training Projects.” Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 103 (484): 1481–95.   
Bansak, Cynthia, and Steven Raphael. 2001. “Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Work-
ers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?” industrial and Labor Relations Review 54 (2): 275–95.  
Bohn, Sarah, Magnus Lofstrom, and Steven Raphael. 2014. “Did the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act 
Reduce the State’s Unauthorized Immigrant Population?” Review of Economics and Statistics 96 (2): 258–69. 
Borjas, George J. 1999. “Immigration and Welfare Magnets.” Journal of Labor Economics 17 (4): 
607–37.   
Borjas, George J.  2006. “Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration.” 
Journal of Human Resources 41 (2): 221–58. 
Card, David. 2001. “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of 
Higher Immigration.” Journal of Labor Economics 19 (1): 22–64.
CNN México. 2010. “Sonora Protesta en Contra de Ley Antiinmigrante.” April 27. http://mexico.cnn.
com/nacional/2010/04/27/sonora-protesta-en-contra-de-ley-antiinmigrante.
Consejo Nacional de Población. 2013. Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México, 
2010. Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación.
Dávila, Alberto, and Jose A. Pagan. 1997. “The Effect of Selective INS Monitoring Strategies on the 
Industrial Employment Choice and Earnings of Recent Migrants.” Economic inquiry 35 (1): 138–
50.
El Universal. 2010a. “Ebrard condena en EU Ley Arizona.” April 27. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/
notas/676209.html.
Table 7—Event Study Estimates of the Effect of SB 1070 on Permanent Return Migration  
to Mexico from Arizona
Dependent variable: Permanent return migration  
 to Mexico from Arizona 1 2 3 4 6 7
After Arizona law, prior to temporary injunction −0.014 −0.026 −0.054 −0.007 −0.015 −0.014
(April 2010–July 2010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.0340) (0.0130) (0.0090) (0.0080)
After Arizona law and after temporary injunction 0.009 0.041 0.013 0.013 0.009 −0.009
(August 2010–December 2010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.035) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Six months prior to passage of Arizona law −0.002
(0.009)
Observations 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 4,005 5,339
Month fixed effects No Yes No No No No
Includes time-varying controls No No Yes No No No
Includes linear time trend No No No Yes No No
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a separate ordinary least squares regression. Sample includes all sur-
veyed undocumented return migrants. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Time-varying controls include the 
unemployment rates of Hispanics working in construction, services (business, repair, and personal services), and 
trade (wholesale and retail) in the states of Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas.
252 AMERicAN EcoNoMic JoURNAL: EcoNoMic PoLicy MAy 2017
El Universal. 2010b. “Ley Arizona afectaría 10,000 mil michoacanos: PRD.” April 26. http://www.
eluniversal.com.mx/notas/675867.html.
El Universal. 2010c. “OEA cuestiona ley antiinmigrante de Arizona.” April 26. http://www.eluniversal.
com.mx/notas/675819.html.
Fry, Richard. 2006. Gender and Migration. Pew Hispanic Center. Washington, DC, July.
Hanson, Gordon H., and Antonio Spilimbergo. 1999. “Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and 
Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border.” American Economic 
Review 89 (5): 1337–57.
Herszenhorn, David M. 2010. “Menendez Urges Boycott of All-Star Game in Arizona.” New york 
Times, May 10. http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/menendez-urges-boycott-of-all-
star-game-in-arizona/.  
Hoekstra, Mark, and Sandra Orozco-Aleman. 2017. “Illegal Immigration, State Law, and Deterrence: 
Dataset.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150100. 
Lowell, B. Lindsay, Jay Teachman, and Zhongren Jing. 1995. “Unintended Consequences of Immigra-
tion Reform: Discrimination and Hispanic Employment.” Demography 32 (4): 617–28.  
Martínez, Julieta. 2010. “BC suma fuerza contra ley Arizona.” El Universal, April 27. http://www.
eluniversal.com.mx/notas/676229.html.
McGrath, Dan. 2010. “Diamondbacks Caught Up in Debate on Immigration.” New york Times, May 1. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/sports/baseball/02dbacks.html.
Orrenius, Pia M., and Madeline Zavodny. 2003. “Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented 
Immigration? Evidence from IRCA.” Demography 40 (3): 437–50.  
Orrenius, Pia M., and Madeline Zavodny. 2009. “The effects of tougher enforcement on the job pros-
pects of recent Latin American immigrants.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 28 (2): 
239–57.
Passel, Jeffrey S., and D’Vera Cohn. 2009. A Portrait of Unauthorized immigrants in the United States. 
Pew Hispanic Center. Washington, DC, April.
Passel, Jeffrey S., and D’Vera Cohn. 2011. Unauthorized immigrant Population: National and State 
Trends, 2010. Pew Hispanic Center. Washington, DC, February.
Passel, Jeffrey, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera. 2013. Population Decline of Unauthorized 
immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed. Pew Research Hispanic Center. Washington, DC, Septem-
ber.
Passel, Jeffrey, D’Vera Cohn, and Molly Rohal. 2015. Share of Unauthorized immigrant Workers in 
Production, construction Jobs Falls Since 2007. Pew Hispanic Center. Washington, DC, March.
Reséndiz, Francisco. 2010. “Presidencia reprueba aprobación de Ley Arizona.” El Universal, April 24. 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/675421.html.
Sanchez, Gonzalo. 2015. “The Response of the Hispanic Noncitizen Population to Anti-Illegal Immi-
gration Legislation: The Case of Arizona SB 1070.” Unpublished.
Watson, Tara. 2013. “Enforcement and Immigrant Location Choice.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Working Paper 19626.
